

RESISTANCE

The Crime of Revolution

By the Smith Act, and the conviction of 11 Stalinists in the New York trial, the American government proclaims its self-perpetuation and inviolability *against its subjects*.

The theoretical foundation of the American government, from its inception in revolution, has been the ultimate authority of the people. This has always been understood as the meaning of the Declaration of Independence, and the justification of revolution by Jefferson and later Lincoln. A government was an evil necessary to safeguard its citizens. A complicated machine, remote from the people, it gave those charged with control of it a power they might abuse and misuse for personal interest or foolish design; procedures of legality might no longer provide redress. The people, to be sure, is not dependably right (in certain respects, almost dependably wrong); but to change, overthrow or abolish the government—as they saw fit—remained the ultimate recourse of the people and, in the last analysis, their single guarantee against despotism.

More recently, it is true, "liberals" have reposed an un-Jeffersonian confidence in government, presumably because the modern government, based on a principle of broader suffrage, has shown greater inclination to use a portion of its enormously expanded power and revenues to compromise with the demands of the voting (and soldiering) underlying population. Since the farmers found out they could get Hoover out of the White House without overthrowing traditional American institutions, and the Thirties-Liberals found out they didn't *really* want a Stalinist America, talk of revolution is not fashionable—the Stalinists themselves repudiate it, and the Smith Act is a formal taking-of-position by the government on the question of its overthrow—a

self-absolution in advance that would, in any other context, be laughed out of court.

But the matter is serious. Unfortunately, Jefferson's concern was optimistic in its implication that, by constant renewal, the alienation of government from people would be checked. On the contrary, the historic process has been a completely unforeseen federal centralization, and therefore utter remoteness. Great economic functions have been assumed by the State and a permanent condition of war-policy—for 50 years—and war—three times in that space—has exaggerated the importance in the lives of people of an institution controlled by the wealthy, the militarily-powerful and the artful crowd-pleaser. Worst of all, the underlying population is *committed* to this alien institution by expectation that its value as a voting, soldiering and producing class will bring it some measure of relief in a society where its condition is (by terms other than the jargon of politics and apologetic economics) intolerable and miserable.

And Jefferson thought a government to coin money, make treaties and fix tariffs, reluctantly empowered by states to do what they could not, was a dangerous institution!

So much have the Republicans popularized "statism" (John Foster Dulles has even made his celebrated prophetic-threat of revolution) that the welfared worker is inclined, in his perplexity, to regard an anti-state position as subversive of his interests. But great perception is not required to understand that the State, and the class for which Dulles is workman and spokesman, have in the course of time become interlocked; government and capitalists are no longer easily separable terms. The struggle is not, as the *slogans* imply, over reduction or increase of the social power and functions of

State or corporations, but is for supremacy of control between politicians concerned with votes and statesmanship and bankers concerned with profits and such-like. And at times it even seems that these political "struggles" are simply a show, for the sake of the masses, in which two protagonists with identical interests each pretend to be battling for the people's rights against a fierce foe. Or (and this is more certainly true) that the capitalists, glad to concede "social welfare," fight it vote-and-slogan so that the workers will be happy at having "won" so much against such opposition; high principles are solemnly sloganized, and the meaning is—nothing. In any case, the effect is that workers either stake their hopes for welfare on the Democrats, or for liberty on the Republicans, and stake nothing on themselves.

The digression is perhaps not merely for its own sake? Now let us try to imagine the achievement, legal-electoral, of significant—i.e., revolutionary—political and economic changes. Significant changes in the direction of greater centralism, greater authority—Yes! readily—but changes in the basic property relations in favor of the lower classes? changes in the basic political structure in the direction of decentralism and non-authoritarianism? or any demand arising from "the people" that is not utilizable by one of the dominant groups?

Indeed, such is the rigidity of government in these respects that anarchists have *always* denied this possibility. Indeed, such is the observed nature of government that anarchists have despaired of government, and can understand the freedom of the people, and their command of their own destinies, only in a non-governmental society.

(Anarchists have never, of course, advocated or favored such a revolution as the Bolsheviks practiced and taught—the seizure of power, the imposition of new authority. Anarchists regard revolution not as their property but as a property of the people, on whose awakening to libertarian consciousness an anarchist revolution depends. That is, the social revolution for any of us can be the work only of all of us.)

So far as they offer solutions, the anarchist statements are hypotheses to be tested. So far as they are descriptions of the historic status quo, the evidence seems to be there.

* * *

Aside from the philosophy of the Smith Act—judged by *our* well-being and not the health of the government—there exists the law (and such laws) as *fact*, social *fact*.

Such liberties as governments tolerate are never abridged for the sake of the act; even in Russia tyranny alleges its expediency against "would-be dictators," "the foreign enemy," etc.; and we need not assume the conscious insincerity of such claims.

As a matter of State-security in a world of war (this is what differentiates—or what is additional in—the Smith Act compared with the criminal-syndicalism laws), the government might be asked to prove the necessity for this law, or even for sup-

pression of the Communists by forthright action.¹ But though the civil liberties-liberals make much of such a point (as some oppose conscription as "not necessary"), honest argument requires prior acceptance of the basic war-view of the American State; and *war itself*, and the existence of social systems that lead to war, are the first enemy.

But we can consider the *other* dynamic aspects of such laws and prosecutions. Here we can apply some of the experience we have accumulated, living through one or more wartimes:

1. Such laws are never, in practice, restricted to their original expediency-justification. For example, the "relocation"-persecution of Japanese Americans, the imprisonment of the 18 Minneapolis Trotskyists under the same Smith Act, the anti-strike Smith-Connelly Act, etc.—harsh, arbitrary, sweeping actions that benefitted anti-oriental chauvinists in California, Dan Tobin and the Communist Party, the employers, etc.

2. From two world wars, and experiences in all degree in European countries we know well enough how fear to express oneself freely, how restriction "for the sake of" liberty, reduces the level of scientific thought, the level of culture, the level of practical thought, makes of each citizen a mindless servant of a State—servant not even out of choice, but now out of habit, docile obedience, mis-education.

3. Still another, related effect is to destroy in people that readiness for change, for evolution, that can offer escape from the deadly trap of war. The impulse of healthy individuals and groups—and of all as they sense the meaning of health—is to strive for release, for genuine solutions. Under the influence of the thought embodied in the Smith Act, the status quo becomes the only imaginable condition, and officially-sponsored change alone is tolerable.

* * *

The treatment of the Communists by the government is such as they demanded for the Trotskyists, and not comparable to the methods of their Russian objects of admiration. However, it is known that there is no limit to the possibilities of restricting liberty in the name of liberty. Before this is done with, we shall probably all have to suffer.

d.w.

¹ It is the curious nature of law that "exceptional laws" are suspected, disliked, seldom enacted. Laws, lawyers are proud, are general and abstract. And, therefore, the Communists are tried, not for what they are and do—this would at least be, in form, an ethical judgment—but for such relation as can be shown to exist between some of their actions and a selected law.

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STATISTICAL METHOD IN SOCIOLOGY

by Paul Goodman

There is now persistent criticism of the quantitative method in sociology that uses millions of dollars of Funds and Grants and the time of rational animals of Institutes and Projects to take polls, make surveys, and give tests. It is pointed out that all this counting yields propositions that everybody knew beforehand, such as (an actual study of a few years ago) that traveling salesmen and sailors are more likely to be unfaithful in marriage. Or yields propositions that are not interesting, have no interesting consequences. Or again, a more serious charge, that the need to concentrate on a countable factor results in missing the essence of a behavior and gives a misleading impression; this is the case in the Kinsey Report whose broad profile of statistics (counted by ejaculations) could have been rather easily drawn from the consensus of a few psychoanalysts, but their interpretation of the figures would be quite different because they regard quality and dynamic relations as of the essence. Generally, when there is a discrepancy between superficial statistics and the essence, known beforehand by some non-statistical means, the sociologist tries to invent other more deep-going countable criteria to take another poll and straighten things out (no doubt Kinsey will come to this); but this means, doesn't it, that the real proof is different from the mass counting, which is either a frill only rhetorically confirming what is known from experience and reasoning, or is "corrected"; the counting does not verify, and it hardly suggests. The justification for the statistical method would be an important proposition contrary to informed expectation and that stubbornly defied re-assessment. Which one?

Now the critics of statistical sociology regard it as an *abuse* of the "scientific method" (method of hypothesis, deduction, and verification). Maybe so. But if it is an abuse, I should like to argue that it is not a meaningless abuse, but a psychologically and socially tendentious one. For the statistical sociology has been accompanied by the following other attitudes: 1. the attitude that social knowledge is as yet too inexact to plan social change; we must learn the facts; and when, in the future, we have "scientific" knowledge of social dynamics, then the social scientists will do things for the general welfare; and 2. the attitude that the sociologists are now willing co-workers in a going social concern, that they are rightfully granted large Funds and conglomerate themselves in Institutes, and they are the advisers of the government (the chief use of their statistics is in campaign and legislative oratory).

These attitudes at once make one suspect that the objective purpose of the sociologists is to insure that there will be no radical change. For it is not the case that not enough is known for immediate major changes; on the contrary, the broadest, simplest, and most important things are known — and disregarded

by the subtlest sociologists. For example, that traffic is congested in an area is not a bashful fact, yet expert city-planners agree to make still another survey to count every car, when everybody understands that the cure, a master plan, is opposed by the property-owners. Must we not say that the planners are contributing to a stall? Or when the Catholic Church is creating anti-sexual attitudes, what shall we say of the educator who contrives new tests of emotional tension and does not cry stinking fish, and continue to cry it, and refuse to be stilled? Or an economist who carefully measures the production-gain from labor-management relations, when he knows that the economy as a whole is based on kinds of sabotage—who's he fooling? Or to mention the war, do some sociologists think this it not a proved disaster? must they collect more facts in order to begin to advance the general welfare by hypothesizing and testing alternatives? (not that this is easy, but the difficulty is not lack of exactitude.)

When the issues are of this order of importance, we find that the sociologists are not counting but ignoring; they prefer to stall in surveys and tests around the periphery. They employ this method in order *not* to come to the important and essential.

II. Psychology of the Sociologists

Kafka speaks of the "attempt to falsify the actuality of knowledge of Good and Evil, to regard knowledge as a goal still to be reached." And this is, he says, "perhaps nothing more than the rationalization of a man who wants to find peace for a moment." The rationalization, what one believably tells oneself; not the conscious prevarication. For I am not attributing bad intentions to the sociologists, but unconscious avoidance and timidity. They have been coordinated into the system of social authority; at the same time, called to be social physicians, they look to heal society; they avoid the conflict, and get "a moment's peace," by asking for more exact knowledge on the model of the physical sciences. It is a way of doing and not doing, of nagging, of touching and avoiding contact.

Most present-day sociologists would call themselves pragmatists, would hold that inquiry is ordered to a needful goal, and the proof of a conclusion is its efficacy in solving the problem. But what would be the right pragmatic use of the scientific method? It would be to respond precisely to the most pressing need (e.g. to prevent the war), to hypothesize and try a "likely" means (e.g. try to change the governmental tone), to reject impatiently that means when it does not pay off, and move on (try to rouse an appreciable and increasing mass-pressure. I am choosing the example for the amateur sociologists of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*). But not for a moment to waste the intelligence on problems and

exactitudes that have no direct relation to the goal. Where such a pragmatic program is attempted, it is not lavishly supported by Funds and Foundations.

But perhaps, imitating the quantitative sciences, the sociologists do not intend to be pragmatists but speculative scientists, discovering the nature of things. But this cannot be, for their propositions are uninteresting, and nature is always interesting; they are inevitably uninteresting, and dull in style, because they avoid the cruxes of the subject-matter. (The eros of their thought is fixed on the repressed *interesting* subject, mankind.) It would be impossible to speculate boldly and scientifically on such a subject and not discover what is gripping and likely terrible and certainly offensive; but one is afraid; there has ceased to be among the sociologists a single man. Therefore I am suspicious that the current practice is not simply an error, the application of a method to an unamenable subject-matter, but a symptom of a professional disease, with hidden tendencies.

Contrast the sociology of the past three decades with that of the century before the first world war. In those days, whether we think of Comte, Proudhon, Marx, Mill, Kropotkin, Durkheim, Sorel, Veblen, Lenin, etc., etc. — the makers of so many interesting propositions whether true or false — men did not avoid the salient issues and they were often, pragmatically, eager to try out the consequences. For every sociologist is by calling a revolutionary; his concern with society and its dynamics is connected with a hankering for radical changes. But there has intervened a traumatic shock and readjustment. The sociologist is still, perhaps, a revolutionary, but the eros of it is driven underground, and on the surface he behaves like a kind of dummy. He is still vitally interested in people (the sociologist is the active counterpart of the novelist), but for safety's sake he prefers to regard them as numbers of items.

III. A Sociologist Meets the "Autonomous Character"

Lastly, I have before me a not uninteresting study of polling-reactions, by David Riesman, as yet unpublished. Part III concerns the "autonomous character — the flexibly self-regulating man as opposed to the "other-directed," the rigid "self-directed" (super-ego dominated), and the "anomic" (lawless). Now after some dozens of pages, the sociologist tells us,

By this time the reader may be as aware as I am that I have not succeeded in drawing a portrait of the autonomous man in a society dependent on other-direction. Attempted descriptions of autonomy today often end either in triviality or extravaganza. For the autonomous are isolated folk . . . are too dispersed to form a party or bloc . . . Beyond families here and there, or small groups of friends and colleagues, I doubt if there exists in America any sizeable institution or organization predominantly composed of autonomous folk.

But he thinks that his scientific difficulty, of isolating a syndrome of countable traits, is a fault of our times, which he hopes we will remedy by various sociological devices such as planning for "increased freedom of consumer choice."

It does not strike Prof. Riesman, (tho it has occurred to him, for I myself have told him so several times), that his scientific difficulty might lie in the

questionnaire method he employs. For why would a free self-regulating person choose to submit to the impertinent questions of a mere theorist, rather than laugh at him, or pat his head, or be Socratically ignorant and turn the questioning the other way, or maybe weep like Heraclitus? If the sociologist seriously has need, on some practical issue, of the opinions and assistance of a free man, then obviously he must come, *himself committed to an active position*, and argue, reason, or implore; risking getting rejected, getting a black eye, or getting more involved than he bargained for. The method of a questionnaire implies that the range of answers is known beforehand to the questioner. Is not this impertinent? Who, on an issue that would be interesting to a free man, has ever seen such a questionnaire, or been questioned by such a questioner? Indeed, it is just to learn how to pose the question aright that one seeks out a free man. Nor is it likely that autonomous people have, or could have, now or ever, an identifiable "style," as Prof. Riesman hopes, for is not their nature to be inventing *new* behavior? As the Emperor said, "Il faut un homme pour connaitre un homme."

(As a literary man I must point out also: that the way to catch the description of spontaneity is not with journalese nor psychologese — all the apparatus in the world will not help — but with poetic rhythms, puzzling epigram, and images that break like the dawn.)

In brief, let the sociologist address himself pragmatically to solving present social disasters, and not write about or plan for these others.

Addendum

One word more on quantitative exactness. The beauty of the quantities in physics lies in the experimental act inducing the co-variations. The matter is not passive but re-active. It is moving the piston in a controlled, isolated system that, as a result, gives Boyle's Law. It is the isolation and control and re-action that determine the essentiality. But where, in society, the subject-matter is uncontrolled, unisolated, and not reacting to experiment, gross experience and sensitive empathy are more likely to hit the important thing, as well as being sufficient for the pressing pragmatic purposes; but what is countable en masse is likely to be a superficial static factor, thus known anyway, as well as irrelevant to the dynamic forces and soon altered by those forces. The pollster, for instance, counts passive conformity (so much is guaranteed by the social relation of polling); this is a strong force but not politically promising.

Of course, the experimental method proper is not out of the question in sociology. The political sociologists of the 19th Century tried to use it. What is needed is a segregated system and, because people are the subject-matter, the benevolent intention of the experimenter. The increase in the social well-being of the system would then prove the essentiality of the hypothesis; mistakes could be chalked up to experience; and perhaps even quantification might ensue (e.g. "so much release of pressure — or segregation, or being experimented on — gives so much better functioning"). Without question sociology really advances in exactitude when sociologists act

as active reformers in segregated social systems. Dewey's Laboratory School partly had this advantage. The Peckham Experiment has it. But a prison seems to me to be the best social laboratory. The bother is that the benevolent experimenter is soon obliged to try the hypothesis that the prisoners would function more *expansively* if he opened the doors

WHEN CZOLGOSZ SHOT McKINLEY

—a Study in Anti-Anarchist Hysteria

by Byron R. Bryant

For some insight into the working of the mass-mind, the sometimes spontaneous generation of mass hysteria and mob-action, and the kind of problems anarchists confront in attempting to think through and bring to fact the abolition of government and the "highest expression of order" which is anarchy, it is more than worthwhile to hark back to one of those times when the word "anarchist" was on everyone's tongue as synonym for bomb-thrower and assassin.

From the history-books we are familiar with the utilization of a patriotic southerner's assassination of Lincoln, to impose a revengeful "peace" on the south; yet probably few of us know of the extraordinary wave of savagery which swept the country when that imposing stooge of Mark Hanna, William McKinley, was assassinated at the Pan American Exposition on September 6, 1901, by an alleged anarchist, Leon Czolgosz.

As soon as Czolgosz fired into McKinley's abdomen the shots which eight days later caused his death, a dozen police bore him to the floor. Foster, a secret service agent, pulled Czolgosz from beneath the heap to strike him viciously across the face while he shouted "You murderer!" Then the free-for-all was on; guards and attendants at the Temple of Music kicked and beat the helpless prisoner savagely. Finally, he was "rescued" and led away while the crowd shouted "Kill him!" "Take him up on the arch and burn him!"

The terror spread rapidly. The Chinese ambassador to the United States, currying American popular favor, suggested that Czolgosz be submitted to what he called the Chinese torture of "lin-chi," the death of a thousand cuts," but many prominent Americans were prepared to outdo the ferocity of his suggestion. That veteran writer of "Over the Hill to the Poorhouse" and other doggerel, Will Carleton, burst into the wildest of exhortations:

Nation with weapons fierce and grim
Sharpen with rage your sadness
Tear the murderer limb from limb—
Torture him into madness!

Ella Wheeler Willcox, more sedate, equally fatuous:

On the Deck our noble Pilot in the glory of his prime
Lies in woe-impelling silence, dead before his hour or
time,
Victim of a mind self-centered, a godless fool of crime.
One of earth's dissension-breeders, one of hate's
unreasoning tools

and liquidated his own role. The good sociological experiment is the political act towards freedom.

The case is quite the contrary of what the sociologists assume: they say, if we knew more sociology, we could change society for the better; rather, if we dared to change society for the better, we should learn more sociology.

Mark Twain's remark that "The base hand that took his life struck dead the hostility in every feeling heart that harbored it," seems mild indeed.

And the hysteria was not confined to the guardians of law and order, nor to Buffalo where the assassination took place, nor to the intellectuals.

* * *

We know, of course, something of the basic mechanisms set off by such an event. The dependence of the average American upon leadership and authority is jolted by the sudden death of a President — most men are frightened and lost. When Roosevelt died ordinary people shed tears on the streets; but where there is a target for revenge — Southerners in 1865, Anarchists in 1901 — hysteria reaches a peak and the outburst is vicious and uncontrollable.¹

Wild reports about European Anarchists, together with the popular version of the Haymarket Affair of only 15 years before, had already established in the public mind a picture of the Anarchist as a bearded bomb-thrower. With this set of mind, Americans were disinclined to ask serious questions: they were uninterested in Czolgosz's motives, or his relation to anarchism and the anarchist movement, or the relation of other anarchists to his act. Czolgosz, all anarchists, and all radicals (for it is not a new habit of the public mind to lump all radicals in one category) were instantly considered guilty of an enormous and vicious crime.

In fact, the answers to these questions are not yet clear. After these many years — and there is no fresh material for us to draw better conclusions — it would be useless to reopen the discussions which raged within the anarchist movement as to whether Czolgosz was an anarchist, whether his act was useful, and so on. What is important to appreciation of the hysterical mob reaction is, that if these questions could have been answered, they were not. Leon Czolgosz went to the electric chair, taken to his death by hysteria and brutal public revenge.

Was Czolgosz really an anarchist? When asked, he replied simply "Yes, I am" — but one must be naive and literal-minded to make a sure conclusion from this, for the question remains, What did anarchism mean to him? He had read at least a few

¹ Only in the case of Garfield was the reaction comparatively calm: a thwarted office-seeker of the president's own party removed a man not yet secure in the presidential role.

issues of *Free Society*, *A Journal of Anarchist Communism*; he had associated with socialist groups in Cleveland, had become interested in anarchism, had heard Emma Goldman speak and had spoken to her. The editor of *Free Society* said he had met Czolgosz but had suspected from his awkward manner of making inquiries that he was a police spy. Czolgosz himself stated he had definitely made up his mind to kill McKinley only the day before he did so; no evidence has ever been discovered that any other Anarchist was aware of his intentions; and one police officer who examined Czolgosz publicly expressed doubt that his prisoner really understood Anarchist theory.

But the dispatches that carried the news of McKinley's death to the world stated that the perpetrator of the act was an "Anarchist," and that was enough to channel the expressions of hysterical outrage.

* * *

The hysteria spread quickly even to small hamlets thousands of miles from Buffalo, and it was not only anarchists — and not only radicals — who were its victims.

H. M. Tichenor, editor of a Socialist paper *The New Dispensation* which was alleged to have "Anarchistic tendencies," was forced to flee from Springfield, Mo., while one of his friends, Fred Young, was assaulted. On the other hand, in one of the amusing results of the tragedy, the "hatchet woman" of Kansas, Carrie Nation, involved herself. In a prohibitionist harangue at Coney Island, she declared, "I have no cares for this McKinley; I have no sympathy for the friend of the brewers. I have no —" But the booing and hissing made it impossible for her to proceed. On a station platform at Rochester, N. Y., she barely avoided lynching by a mob which shouted, "She was glad McKinley was killed; let's kill her!"

So humorless and intense was the search for "Anarchists" that when the police discovered in Grand Central Station an obviously insane person who declared he was on his way to Washington to kill President Theodore Roosevelt, an immediate attempt was made to discover his "Anarchist affiliations." While the forces of law and order breathlessly awaited his "revelations," the prisoner declared solemnly, "It would be better if we had an emperor." While everyone digested this pronouncement he added "I want to know what the police mean by getting after me. It costs me a lot of money to get away from them, for they are always after me."

The most general critical remarks about McKinley were often enough to incite mob action.

Joseph A. Wildman, a United Brethren minister of Huntington, Ind., was tarred and feathered by his church-members because he declared in his church that "I suppose there have been more lies told from the pulpit and sacred desk today than was ever known before. While I want to give all honor that is due Mr. McKinley, still when he was living he was nothing but a political demagogue."

A carpenter in Guthrie, Oklahoma, who was supposed to have declared that "he would not march under an American flag," was saved from a lynching mob of 500 only through intervention of the local militia.

Dr. Mary Walker, an exponent of woman's suffrage who dressed in male attire, declared in a railway station in Syracuse, N. Y., that "The state of New York if it electrocutes the assassin of McKinley is just as great a murderer as he is. President McKinley was a murderer because he killed the poor Filipinos." Only belief in her eccentricity saved her from rough treatment.

Private Devine, of the U. S. Cavalry, who expressed "great satisfaction" in regard to the president's death, was thrown in a darkened room on short rations, then sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.

These samples of incidents as far apart as Fairmont, Neb., Quenemo, Kan., Cleveland, O., Marshfield, Ore., and New York City, indicate that sectional differences were unimportant, the reaction was truly country-wide — a commentary on the average American's pride in his "individuality."

The mob was not always so wide of its mark. The many instances where Anarchists were its victims are too much to detail here. Emma Goldman was arrested, roughly handled. Her statements that such actions as Czolgosz's could be expected as one means of protesting tyranny were hardly calculated to allay widespread suspicion that she was somehow responsible for the assassination. Johann Most, a violently revolutionary anarchist who had modified his position, denounced Czolgosz's action — but this did not save him from once again being sent to prison for "sedition." The Home Colony group in the state of Washington was saved from attack by a Seattle mob only by the heroic intervention of two conservative citizens, one of them a German Lutheran minister. In Spring Valley, Ill., where *L'Aurora* was issued, the Congregational minister called on his followers to run the Anarchists out of town; the test of a man's Anarchical sympathies was to be his willingness to sign a petition calling on Congress to suppress "Anarchy."

Public opinion was fired by such news dispatches as one from Wichita, Kan., that "Anarchists at both Chicopee and Frontenac, small towns 100 miles east of here, held jubilation meetings today and gave thanks over the attempted assassination of the president." That at Chicopee was held underground in a coal mine (sic). More serious, a band of 30 vigilantes swooped upon an Anarchist settlement at Guffey Hollow, near Pittsburgh, Pa., and yelled like Indians and fired repeatedly until the 25 families suspected of Anarchistic tendencies agreed to move.

And in New York a crowd attacked the offices of the Jewish anarchist *Freie Arbeiter Stimme*, threw stones at the building, while the editors escaped over the rooftops. One, A. Yanowsky, was later cornered in the neighborhood, and when he sought refuge in a restaurant the proprietor handed him over to the mob, which beat him until he was almost unconscious, left him lying on the sidewalk.

* * *

The young Czolgosz was electrocuted by the state of New York (October 29, 1901), the fever of the mob cooled off slowly. Among its visible permanent signs it left the law (still in effect, and since made more severe) that Anarchist aliens may not become U. S. citizens. Now this is history, a small corner of the history of America and the anarchist movement.

But it serves to make us more aware of the chaos of hysterical fears and sadistic impulses, immediately beneath the surface complacency of Americans, that are likely in a time of crisis to make one's next-door neighbor an even more fearsome adversary than the impersonal government. We are used to this thought; it is almost a cliché; sometimes we forget it is also true. With this kind of mob spirit, anarchism clearly has nothing to do: it is not in order to turn loose self-appointed bodies exercising the functions of government (judging others, even condemning them to death) without the usual permanent structure, that we seek to abolish government.

Whenever the normal functions of government break down — or when, as in the Old West, they never existed, or when they have not responded quickly enough to popular prejudice — the conditions for the mob exist. The conservative warns us, with considerable truth, that the outcome can be only unimaginable terror and confusion. It is then we ask ourselves which may yet be worse: governments which lead their people madly along the road to destruction, or public prejudice which may be even more ferocious than the authority which created and misdirected it. But if we would look for something more positive than this warning, we will find it in the thought that this will happen *unless* — that is to say, it can be avoided *if* — there is a comprehension of the need for genuinely Anarchistic activity — for activity which assumes the individual's right to unhampered self-development. To the creation of such a comprehension and capacity for comprehension, we are forcefully reminded, we must address ourselves.

The Winds of Want and Aid

What has happened in the City?
The people have all gone blank.
Anxious, alone. Isolate, separate.
Hurrying this way and that.
Do they know they have needs?
Do they know these needs are satisfiable?
Rushing along the streets, or encased in cars,
Defensive, self-absorbed,
Do they know they desire? do they desire?

The winds of want and aid have blown away
And we lie in the doldrums, but rush about
Self-propelled, exhausted, unmoved. And the air is heavy.

Without desire or pleasure why choose anything?
Don't choose. The air is heavy. Rush about the streets

Blankly. In this hothouse, this inhuman condition
Nothing grows but sudden violence.
Without desire and pleasure what is anything?
In this heavy air nothing grows but dreams of violence.

IRVING FELDMAN



Off the Press

To be published February 15: *A Field of Broken Stones*, by Lowell Naeve, in collaboration with David Wieck; with a preface by Paul Goodman. 260 pages, with approximately 50 drawings by the author. \$3.00. Published by *Libertarian Press*, Box A, Glen Gardner, New Jersey. Copies may be ordered from the *Libertarian Press*, or from *Resistance*.

A Field of Broken Stones is an autobiographical story of the experiences of one of America's imprisoned war objectors during the second World War. It is a simply told story of the reactions of a man to prison, of the resistance of individuals and groups to the prison system, of the development of a man's personality as he strives to retain personal dignity and individuality within a regime of impersonal regimentation.

Retort Press announces the publication of: *Prison Etiquette: the Convict's Compendium of Useful Information*, edited, and with an introduction by, Holley Cantine & Dachine Rainer. *Prison Etiquette* is an anthology of the wartime writings of imprisoned conscientious objectors, edited with special emphasis on techniques of resistance & psychological survival. These writings are presented in three sections: 1. Resistance in Prison, 2. The Prison Community, and 3. Arts & Letters. Among the contributors are Cliff Bennett, Lowell Naeve, Dave Wieck, Curtis Zahn, Bill Kuenning, Jim Peck, Howard Schoenfeld, Sturge Steinert, Arthur Kassin. The book, which was one year in the making, was entirely hand typeset, printed & bound by Holley Cantine & Dachine Rainer & is illustrated by Lowell Naeve. It has 150 pp. & sells for \$2.50. The book will be given free to those who cannot afford the price, & the publishers welcome contributions above the price to *Retort Press Fund*.

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PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ANARCHISM

by David Wieck

The scope of this article is preliminary questions: the relevance and possible value to anarchism of psychoanalytical ideas and theories. It is my intention at a future time to try to show what, specifically, we can learn from psychoanalysis; though this psychological method is a half-century old, it must still be discussed in a tentative way.

Our anarchist ideas are in part logical, in part intuitive, in part emotional; but inevitably (like any social idea), they imply definite, if not always recognized, assumptions about the nature of man (psychology) and the nature of society or relations among men (sociology). Some anarchists have denied that scientific or sociological arguments have weight—the point of view of Malatesta, for example, against Kropotkin: the idea that the data of scientists were interesting but not significant, since anarchism was a question of thought and will. But we cannot avoid psychological and sociological assumptions: Malatesta's were that man is by nature capable of living in a free society; that 20th century man can learn to live in freedom; that an anarchist society is probable enough to warrant the sacrifice of alternative goals—just the assumptions that non-anarchists challenge.

Psychology and sociology give us systematic methods to determine whether pleasing ideas are in harmony with knowable facts; to find out what causes social changes and what actions are likely to produce the effects we desire. This does not mean that the attitudes and actions of anarchists can (or ought to) be scientific and calculated; rather, anarchists should be aware of what specialists have done, should themselves study these problems.

This may seem too obvious, but it is necessary to speak against a certain anti-intellectual and anti-scientific tendency that is the result, partly, of disappointment of the hopes of Kropotkin, Marx and others of the 19th century who developed (or were influenced by) somewhat simplified and progress-centered theories of man and history; from this has resulted also a feeling that perhaps anarchism is contradicted by the bleak social facts and can be defended only as an ideal and a faith. But psychoanalytic psychology, because of its emphasis on the non-rational, is of all social sciences, the least immediately encouraging; yet I believe it can be shown to afford much supporting evidence for anarchism, and to suggest new lines of action.

It remains—of course—that how we look at the world, how the world and ourselves and friends look to us, has nothing to do with scientific researches or large books; not by science, but feeling do we have anarchist values, desires and dreams.

Psychoanalysis is, by origin, the treatment of mental illness by helping the patient discover in his own life the events that cause him to behave in a "neurotic" way. When the person becomes fully aware of the conflicts, desires and fears underlying his present difficulties—when these are drawn from

unconsciousness to consciousness—he is able to face them once more, in more favorable conditions, and possibly solve them satisfactorily. This was the assumption of psychoanalysis as a medical method, and it worked.¹

For psychology the implications of such a method were revolutionary. Here was a way, without precedent, to understand a person, not just in terms of what he does, but in terms of the reasons—most of which he would ordinarily be unable to express—*why* he does these things. And, not only could a person's present behavior be explained, but much of the intricate development of his personality could be reconstructed.

This was as true, it was found, of "normal" people as the mentally ill; *no one* could be understood without regard to what was unconscious, repressed in his mind.

Obviously, such a startling uncovering of the workings of the human mind could come only by radically new techniques. Hypnosis, itself an extraordinary technique, has shown how behavior could be motivated by ideas and impulses of which the person was totally unaware (unconscious). In its stead Freud developed remarkable techniques: analysis of the "little" aspects of a person's behavior: the things he dreamed, the things he said in an unguarded moment, his habits and his forgettings, the "psychopathology of everyday life." Just because these techniques were new, just because *these* were things people had agreed to ignore (dismissed as "nonsense" and "meaningless"), just because (said the analysts) people realized how much that they preferred to keep hidden could be revealed by these methods, they have, ever since, been the subject of ridicule and disbelief.

At the same time there have passed into the common fund of popular knowledge gross distortions of the Freudian method; enemies of psychoanalysis make great sport of destroying straw men. It would be unreasonable if Freud had simply asserted that he could translate his patients' dreams and thereby discover their personality; or that every dream is the pictorialization of a desire and its fulfillment. Instead, dreams were, to Freud, the "royal road to the unconscious"; he insisted that his *patients* interest themselves in their dreams, he used these little indications to discover the chinks in the armor of repression, and helped *the patient* make his unconscious conflicts conscious. Then Freud was in a position to show how repressed desires and fears were so important to the individual that they insistently demanded expression; but that they contained such great danger to the person that they could appear only in such distortion and in such irrelevant places that their real meaning was never recognized.

I am purposely oversimplifying. But unfortunately it is still on this level that psychoanalysis is so commonly discussed. In fact, it is no longer really worth

¹ Psychoanalytic techniques have, of course, become much more complicated.

the trouble to refute these objections. Freud wrote masterful presentations of his ideas and experiences, the evidence is there. Even most academic psychologists now acknowledge that psychoanalysis is valid in its original sphere, and resist only the tendency of this all-embracing technique to swallow up the whole of their psychology. It is to something further I wish to pass.

The fact that analysis enables discovery of a person's present character, and its past, does not mean that one can therefore *predict* how a person will develop. Though it has been repeatedly attempted, it is not possible to make simple statements of the kind of character certain experiences will favor—it has not yet been possible to take enough experiences into account. But it does not require long study of psychoanalysis to find that some facts are significant in the lives of nearly everyone, in some way. An economist could readily tell us that the fact men work for wages will have a significant effect on their lives (though not always the same); this is obvious, we hardly need an economist to tell us so; but we have needed psychoanalysts to tell us other things, because they deal with precisely what is *not* obvious, precisely what we have agreed is not to be obvious to us.

Freud called attention to what it was that the dreams and slips of memory and speech of his patients usually led to, what it was they were most generally ignorant of, something else people had agreed not to discuss: sex.

In Freud's early work what stood out was that in each case conflict over sexual impulses was one of the roots of illness. That is, people had sexual desires; cultural demands and their own upbringing and experiences caused them to regard these as dangerous, shameful; they repressed these desires (i.e., pretended to forget them), but the conflict raged, the desires continued to strive for outlet, symptoms were formed, and people were remarked to be mentally ill.

But it is always answered, we do not all have these same simple troubles! And this is true.

But Freud's investigations widened, he was able to go back in his patients' experiences, beyond simple sexual conflicts of adolescence or the age of nine or ten; he found he could reconstruct many of the elements of childhood that had given the personality of a child a certain shape, a certain fixed "character." Among the early character-forming events were: the child's love for its parents, the authority and training to which the child was required to conform, the child's ability to gratify its desires, the techniques that worked for the child and those that didn't (passivity, obedience, rebellion, etc.). And he found (third horror!) that the emotional life of the child was largely bound up with an early sexual life: sexual desire for the mother or other persons, masturbation, threats of castration and shocks of knowledge, and even earlier sensory-erotic feelings and pleasures connected with nursing, with elimination and toilet-training—pleasures that Freud termed sexual because in direct line of development to genital sexuality. At the same time Freud was able to trace part of the development of aggressive and sadistic impulses, how these became inhibited, and so on.

The stress on the world of infantile emotion as decisive in formation of character (and therefore in limitation of the variety of possible behavior) suggests immediately the need, and the possibility, of re-examining and reshaping our ideas on child-raising and education. It does more. Freud had taken a corner of the cover off "human nature." "Human nature" was a dumping-ground for all non-rational behavior prevalent in a society; observed differences between people in different cultures were disposed of by explaining that some were "primitive" and some "advanced" in human evolution. Now Freud showed (more even than he realized) how powerful drives could be traced to specific events in the early years of life.

A means of discovering a little better what *is* human nature and what the product of a specific culture and training! A means of discovering the things that are important in people's development, suggesting that here we might have the key to the psychology of war, acquisitiveness, strivings for dominance—things that antagonists of anarchism claimed to be inherent in human nature. Hardly could there be a more exciting field! What Freud's particular theories were was no great matter, the possibilities were enormous.

In general, anarchists have not looked eagerly for the implications of these methods, or the data accumulated. Instead they have waited for the analysts to present them with pro-anarchist conclusions. The analysts, not being anarchists, but being simply medical men or (usually tolerably bad) scientists, with the average social prejudices of medical men and scientists, have not. And psychoanalysis has been used perhaps as often in justification of the status quo as the reverse (for example, much of the wartime "psychoanalytical" writing about fascism and the war; but after all, the simplest arts and sciences may be prostituted to war).

The data and method remain:

1. We have a means of self-knowledge—to understanding of our motives and capacities and feelings; a means to strengthen ourselves.

2. We are made aware of a whole range of crucial facts, previously ignored: sex; the unconscious motivation of behavior; the influence of emotional factors on rational thought.

3. We have wholly new insights into the nature of childhood, and a promising basis for a theory of child-raising and education.

4. We have the rudimentary basis for a theory of human nature.

These claims are purposely understated slightly (in the view of adherents of some schools, enormously). But if the basic method of psychoanalysis is straightforward and verifiable, its theory is not always so (the methodology of most analysts leaves much to be desired, the uniqueness of each case offers difficulties to generalizing, etc.); this, however, I want to leave to another time. Likewise I am omitting the direct therapeutic value of psychoanalysis, not because it should be underestimated but because what I want to emphasize here is the value of psychoanalysis as the most deep-going, and promising, psychology we have.

PSYCHE, SOMA AND FREEDOM

by Michael Grieg

So unhappy, so involved are we in the complications of our unhappiness, that *The Open Self* with its direct and often simple analysis of our dilemmas is almost impertinent. Yet it is good to be reminded how simple our problems are — we may yet take the responsibility of doing something about them! Charles Morris is optimistic — and though that's a relief for a change — so optimistic that his book, at worst, sounds like a mishmash of highbrow Dale Carnegie and lowbrow Walt Whitman.

Morris, this book and another aside, is a leading semanticist, author of *Signs, Language and Behavior*. He put aside his technical studies of language when he began to hear sentences like the one spoken by a smartly dressed girl, fresh from sailing on Long Island Sound: "I would like to ride in the plane that would atom-bomb Western culture." What are the reasons, Morris asks, for this unrecognized wish for annihilation which at times secretly welcomes current possibilities of destruction? Why are we faced, collectively and individually, with frustration, closure, sterility, destruction?

Morris doesn't hold with the death instinct (and he overlooks too easily Freud's sounder ideas). The types of temperament and physique described by the American psychologist, W. H. Sheldon, suggest to Morris his more optimistic analysis. As anarchists have been saying, and as Morris says often more pungently, we're in a rut because each of us is not able to grow in our own unique way. Persons of one temperament and physique are kept from satisfying their psychosomatic needs by persons of another temperament and physique, who have enthroned their personal patterns in coercive relationships.

From Sheldon's three clusters of temperamental traits (viscerotonia, somatotonia and cerebrotonia), Morris risks over-simplification by identifying each physique with a basic motivation. The endomorph (soft, rounded physique) requires dependence, a dependable environment of friendly people, a world in harmony with the body by not demanding too much physical or psychological effort. The mesomorph (muscled bony physique) seeks domination, a controllable world rather than dependable one, "power over persons and things, the excitement of overcoming, the sense of domination." The ectomorph (spine-centered, long and thin) needs detachment — not dependency, not power, but awareness of oneself, self-containedness with the world at a safe distance. Hardly anyone is a perfect type, Morris cautions, but a particular type may be dominant.

The trouble starts when we force others — or ourselves — to frustrate basic motivations. Somewhere at one time or another, with grave consequences, a majority of stomach-centered persons have required others to seek comfort and dependency; the chest-centered have forced others into a rat-race of ceaseless go and get; the spine-centered have demanded asceticism of everyone. Frustrated, a genuine need for dependence collapses into helplessness and submission; mesomorphic frustration turns to the neurotic form of aggressiveness; need for detach-

ment expresses itself in withdrawal. If several needs are in conflict with one another, we risk the danger of indecision, ceaseless anxiety, fragmentation.

One is almost charmed into swallowing rising objections when Morris uses his simple scheme of reference for sidelights such as this:

... The social character of our culture has been largely formed by mesomorphs. That this occurred is due to the fact that the first difficult migrations to this country, and the physical labor needed in the conquest of the new environment, filled the land at the outset with mesomorphs. Domination, not dependence or detachment, was the trait necessary to explore and to develop a new and northern continent. We advanced the great mesomorphic thrust of Western man. The traits of mesomorphic leaders, given to domination, became the accepted personality ideal of the new country; in shaping its social agencies such leaders shaped the social character of its inhabitants. Courage, strength, resourcefulness, adventuresomeness, independence, confidence became the desirable personality traits, and wealth and prestige the reward. Our country was built largely by the mesomorph, and his traits of character became the accepted social ideal of what a person should be.

This still is true, but with important changes. For as time passed our population grew more diversified. Partly because mesomorphs do not have only mesomorphic children. Partly because as the environment was brought under control it could attract a more diversified array of settlers. An easier life exercised less rigorous selection towards mesomorphy upon the newcomers and upon the newly born. Endomorphs and ectomorphs became more numerous among us. And the mesomorphic social character into which they were trained, and toward which they strived, was not satisfying, though they did not know why. Success in competition for power did not come as easily to them. Anxieties and frustrations increased. Deviants became more common. A new and unrecognized kind of minority was beginning to appear among us — a psychological minority. That men low in mesomorphy have their difficulties in our society is clear: they make up a large proportion of the male population of our asylums.

Even the mesomorph among us has his wounds, and is in need of salvage. The greater the number of persons who share a single personality ideal, the greater is competition — and frustration. As time passed power became concentrated in fewer hands and the access to power more limited. More and more mesomorphs became laborers for other persons, cogs of industry, tools of someone else's power. Fewer spent a muscled day of their own decision. The traits of courage and adventuresomeness and independence became harder to maintain even for mesomorphs, and the rewards of prestige harder to secure. But the ideals remain unchanged. So the struggle for their attainment becomes more intense. Less time for love and receptivity, less time for meditation and reflection, less direct satisfying use of the mesomorphic body. More sternness, more unrelenting push, more concern with the signs of power, more symbolic mesomorphy. Money becomes something to get, whatever the psychological price, because money buys the signs of power if not its actuality. So even the mesomorphs pay a price. For most of them the price is high. Compulsive domineering aggression is mesomorphy gone wrong, mesomorphy exaggerated, self-betrayed, and ill at ease. The manics and the paranoiacs in our midst exhibit the results for open inspection . . . The average citizen of Plainville manifests his distress in

subtler ways, in envy, in fear of innovation, in an exaggerated sense of righteousness, in refusal to talk about himself — even to himself.

Morris believes that the way out of our mesomorphic power trap consists in an overhauling of our relationships, our institutions. The direction, he says, must be toward flexibility, diversity, inventiveness — what he calls an open society of open selves, in which all varieties of persons can develop individual forms of integrity. This is in contradistinction to what Heinz Politzer describes as the American insistence that all citizens be individualists, but all in the same way, complete with hobbies and whimsies.

Optimistic, Morris suggests a growing current of feeling for a pattern of pluralism. A change in the American ideal, he infers, and offers an interesting study of the reactions of a thousand college students throughout the country, in which they were asked to score in terms of desire various ways of life. The most first choices out of thirteen ways of life, (ranging from a life of contemplation to one of power) went to a pattern expressing pluralism. This way of life postulated:

Life should contain enjoyment and action and contemplation in about equal amounts. When either is carried to extremes we lose something important for our life. So we must cultivate flexibility, admit diversity in ourselves, accept the tension which this diversity produces, find a place for detachment in the midst of enjoyment and activity. The goal of life is found in the dynamic integration of enjoyment, action and contemplation, and so in the dynamic interaction of the various paths of life. One should use all of them in building a life, and no one alone.

Only by implementing this new social ideal, says Morris, can we free our psychosomatic minorities. The alternative is the psychotic way of war, the saturation point of sterility and frustration. "The danger is that we will sell out, lose our nerve, let possessiveness stifle our creativeness, refuse to assume our responsibility toward ourselves and toward our fellow-men, mutter ancient incantations, move to closure."

Morris moves so close to anarchism in *The Open Self* (in fact, Wayne A. R. Leys, in *The Philosophical Review*, calls his objective relativism just

In the last issue of *Resistance* there appeared two articles, one entitled *Religion and Education* by Irving Feldman, and the other, a reply to Irving's article, *Philosophy and Religious Thought*, by David Wieck. The central part of each article deals with the work of Wilhelm Reich, and since I believe the opinions expressed on that subject to be faulty, I submit the following criticism based on my study of Reich's work.

It is clear that Irving Feldman's article, *Religion and Education* is based on the writings of Wilhelm Reich. He has not, however, presented these concepts as they appear in Reich's books, but has distorted them in a mystical way. No reference is made to orgone energy, but only to "the Great Energy (God)," "soul energies," and "Universal

that), that it is hard to see how he avoids becoming an anarchist. But he does. Like other near-anarchists (Erich Fromm is another), Morris is often anarchist in general and something else in particular. He lists as "great strides toward an open society of open selves" such increments in political coercion as free and compulsory education, "the war against slavery," "an income tax to prevent unlimited concentration of wealth." These are, at the very least, ambiguous assaults on mesomorphic monopoly!

Worse, though, is that Walt Whitman mood, when Morris starts to chant, "Yet I have great faith in this America. I believe it will grow strong in crisis. I cherish its diversity, its gay surface, its long will, its play-the-game-well nonchalance. I believe Americans will keep it bold and young. Thousands of them dedicated to their task will turn the key," etc., etc. In that mood, Morris is capable of taking a real semanticist's holiday to burble: "The government of the people by the people for the people has worked at its task of protecting the individual from exploitation by other individuals and furnishing him with the instruments needed for his growth." Where? When? How?

At such moments one grows a little wary of the type of analysis Morris employs, despite the point of view he reaches. For all the talk of diversity, maybe, like Whitman, he's only concerned with some simple-minded ideal of democratic man. Certainly his scheme of reference, his three basic types and drives, pay little if any heed to much rich though tragic causality. Scant mention, for instance, is made of childhood experiences, the psychoanalytic touchstone, which could alter physique significantly. Too simple an optimism fails to recognize such sociological factors as the inertia of habits and institutions, or just plain stupidity on the part of man — operating outside physique and temperament. After all, little follows by itself from an awareness of biological needs. Wider knowledge, experience and a healthy unconscious are still prerequisites for integral freedom.

Still, the simple insights Morris has are valid in their own right, emphasizing in a fresh way that only by fluid and experimental relationships have we a chance for health and happiness.

THE REICHIAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER

energy"; indeed, no reference is made to Wilhelm Reich, the man to whom Irving is indebted for his knowledge. This is a very irresponsible act, and is not excusable on the grounds that the ideas presented have been changed, for their basis was in Reich's work, and Irving's presentation calls at least for a statement of just how much was Reich and how much was Feldman. The consequences of leaving out such statement are clear when one reads, in Dave Wieck's article, "The specific notions Irving presents are those of the psychology and physics of Wilhelm Reich."

This is not true. What Irving has done is this: he has taken a body of knowledge, re-termed it, re-phrased it, and by rephrasing distorted it, and separated it from the experimental data from which it originated. Once this has been done, rational scientific discussion is impossible, for facts and theories which evolved from scientific experimentation cannot be separated from their source; moreover they exist and have a meaning *only* in relation to their source. Once one has made this split between term and source, one is free to bat the words about as one chooses, using poetic terminology,

religious terminology, etc., and the whole thing rests in the world of opinion and speculation.

It would be a good idea at this point to find out exactly what Reich does say about religion. I quote from the *International Journal of Sex-economy and Orgone Research*, Volume 1, pp. 105:

I recently had to revise some of my earlier evaluations of religion. There was a time when I believed, with the rationalist Marxists, that religion was a conscious invention of the ruling class for the purpose of dominating the ruled classes. There was a time when I believed, with the psychoanalysts, that religion was a compulsion neurosis, that there was nothing genuine in religious feelings, that, in other words, there were no "oceanic feelings," no "cosmic sensations," that, in short, religion, with everything that belongs to it, was an "illusion."

Now, it is true, without doubt, that brutal ruling forces utilize the existing religiosity of the masses the better to suppress them. But that does not mean that the ruling interests of money or political power created these religious feelings in the masses. Also, there is no doubt that most religious ideas are of an illusionary character in the sense that we recognize as unrealistic the ideas of "God," of sin, of salvation and of a return of the dead. However, all this does not alter the existence and the reality of religious and cosmic feelings and sensations, whatever their ideational expression may be. Though there is no personal God, yet there is doubtless an extremely powerful feeling which brings humans to the point of believing in the existence of a personal God. We have to make a sharp distinction between the *ideational content* of religion on the one hand and the *religious feeling* on the other hand; the former is clearly unreal, while the latter is a *decisively important reality*.

I hope I have shown that the specific notions Irving presents are not those of Wilhelm Reich, that they are Irving's notions based on his understanding or misunderstanding of Reich. Dave Wieck, however, lumps Reich and Feldman together, and where his criticisms of Irving's article may be correct, they are not also valid in regard to Reich.

Dave says that an all-encompassing universal explanation of reality is typical of religions and is their "practical failure and evil." With this I agree. However, this does not in the least imply that a unitary concept of nature is invalid if it rests on a scientific basis. One indeed progresses "warily from fact to fact," but unless the new facts lead to a simplification and unification of the phenomena, science is sterile and there is something basically wrong. The ever-progressing complication of contemporary physics

will soon make obvious its theoretical fallacies. All great progress in science has resulted in a further simplification, a finding of that which previously remote facts have in common. The method of approach which enabled Reich to make such fruitful progress is the functional one. In his studies of the common factor in life, Reich found time and time again that what seemingly unconnected life manifestations had in common was their basic function of pulsation, an energy function. An amoeba has nothing in common with the human organism from the point of view of a mechanistic scientist, but to Reich the common factor was a definite formula of pulsation in which energy was discharged. Thus the search for the common led to the study of function in living organisms, and the study of function to the discovery of the energy which causes the pulsation. This led to the elucidation of how this same energy functions in the realm of the non-living. Thus the search for the common led from the "fields" of psychology to biology to physics. That this seems like a "big jump" is only true from the point of view which conceives of the universe as chopped up into separate "fields" of study, and that to go from one "field" to the next is heresy.

Dave goes on, after making some good criticisms of Irving's article, to talk about Reich. "In large part these are questions of scientific fact, upon which not ourselves are competent to pass," Dave declares, and then goes on to pass on them. And now Dave adopts a curious line of reasoning for an Anarchist. He argues from acceptance. "Some of Reich's statements have gained wide support from psychologists . . ." he says, and then later, "Other of his statements have little support from other scientists." That the world is round was not accepted for quite a while. For an Anarchist to argue from this basis seems extremely naive. Of course, if one is under the illusion that science is purely "objective" (and by science I mean the world of scientists, as science exists only in the form of the opinions of scientists) and that it somehow escapes the inevitable prejudices, fears and structural distortions inherent in its function as a pillar of authoritarian society, it is time to wake up and realize to what extent "objectivity" can be not only a fraud, but a basic scientific (and philosophic) contradiction.

Dave goes on to say that ". . . Reich's excursions into the nature of the universe, . . . orgone energy, and so on, must be considered mainly speculation until a body of evidence is arrayed behind it." This implies, of course, that there is no such body of evidence. As a matter of fact, there is. This is presented specifically in *The Discovery of the Orgone*, Vol 2, *The Cancer Biopathy*, pp. 84ff. and *International Journal for Sex-economy and Orgone Research*, Vol. 3, pp. 97ff. This evidence is irrefutable, some of the experiments are easily re-

peatable, and if anyone can offer a better explanation for the phenomena, the Orgone Institute, I am sure, would be glad to hear from them. Not only is the experimental evidence for the existence of orgone energy irrefutable, but orgone energy has been used as the sole source of energy to run a standard electric motor.¹ This is not the work of a speculative theory.

In a footnote to this context Dave says "Reichians reject all such demands for evidence with the remark that it is the 'character structure' of 'mechanistic scientists' that blinds them to the true physics. However pleasing such circular defenses may be to a Reichian, scientific discussion cannot proceed with such 'assumptions.'" I do not answer here for Reichians." Anyone who uses the concepts of mechanistic science and character structure as *arguments* betrays his lack of knowledge. These concepts are explanations. Reich's scientific work stands wholly on experimental evidence. Its justification is based on the facts and the logic of his organization of the facts into theories. However, once the facts have been established and it is apparent that these facts are world-shaking and seemingly very apparent, one asks, "Why have not scientists seen these before? And of those things they have seen, why have they not understood them?" This calls for an answer, and the answer is in the mechanistic-vitalistic split in science, the splits of culture vs. sexuality, soma vs. psyche, etc., which are a reflection of the character structure of the average human being today, a character structure which is distorted by the blocking of its functioning as a unit, a block which distorts the scientist's first tool of research, his perception and self-perception, which are functions of the matter and energy of his organisms in relation to his environment and himself. For a fuller exposition of this concept see *Character Analysis*, pp. 443ff. Again I repeat, this is not an argument to substantiate any of Reich's findings. It is an explanation *after the fact*. By the same token it cannot be used as an argument *against* Reich's findings. That is, one cannot say, Reich is wrong because other scientists have not accepted him.

I would like to add that Reich cannot be held responsible for the opinions and actions of "Reichians." From what I have heard, a "Reichian" is someone who has a very incomplete knowledge of Reich's work and uses what knowledge he has in neurotic ways, to justify his pet theory, his neurotic actions, etc. However, there are some people who are seriously studying Reich and are trying to do what they can to forward healthy conditions for adolescents, help parents understand the concepts of self regulation, etc. These should be sharply separated from the typical "Reichian."

Incidentally, Reich has not "translated" facts of "sexuality, genitality and the orgasm" into a "cosmology." The

1. See *Orgone Energy Bulletin*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 7ff.

discoveries of the atmospheric orgone, etc., rest on their own experimental substantiation, and have nothing to do with a "translation" of facts, as Dave declares.

My last criticism is of Dave's argument that "'natural' is the language of religion. We prefer to rest on the reasonable basis that there are things demonstrably good and bad for ourselves and all human beings; . . ." Is not "good and bad," however, historically the language of religion and its companion, ethics? True, in a healthy society one would not have to make the conscious jump from "what is," by way of our particular system of "good and bad," to "what should be." Our feelings would tell us accurately and better than the intellect what was desirable and not desirable. But in their present historical context, good and bad are not scientific terms. "Natural," however, can be very definite. True, everything that exists is natural, by virtue of its very existence. Reich, however, when referring to human behavior, uses the word "natural" to mean that behavior which results when humans function intellectually, emotionally, physically, as a unit. That is, when they are healthy. The notion of "natural" is not arbitrary here. There is a very definite criteria of what is natural or healthy, and what is sick. The "natural" can never be "cured." Orgastic potency cannot be "cured"; orgastic impotence can; love cannot be "cured," irrational hate can; a dynamic yet relaxed musculature cannot be "cured," chronic muscular tension can. The natural has nothing to do with human values, concepts, ideologies, etc.; it has to do with that which develops in living organisms, and which, if it is not allowed to develop in harmony with itself, will be distorted in certain typical ways, causing pain and sickness. Man discovers the natural; he does not create it.

I hope this article has helped to clear up some of the misconceptions about Reich which are running rampant among Anarchists as well as other groups. There is altogether too much talk and too little knowledge about Reich, and it is very rarely that one hears an argument based on facts and not solely on opinion.

—KARL RILEY

It All Works Out In the End

Ah, the poor have children—
Man's primal need;
And the rich have armies,
Which sow their seed.

Kenneth Patchen

BOOKS IN REVIEW

PIONEERS OF AMERICAN FREEDOM, by Rudolf Rocker (translated by Arthur E. Briggs). Rocker Publications Committee, 2101 S. Gramercy Pl., Los Angeles 7, Calif. 181 pp. and bibliography. \$3.

Rocker, an old man of long experience in the European anarchist movement, author of the standard "Anarcho-Syndicalism" and the encyclopedic "Nationalism and Culture," now a resident of America, gives here a survey of American "liberals" (Paine, Jefferson, Emerson, Thoreau, Garrison, Phillips, Lincoln) and the "radicals" (the anarchists Josiah Warren, Stephen Pearl Andrews, Lysander Spooner, William B. Greene, Benjamin R. Tucker).

Presented by its publishers as a kind of argument for "liberalism" by a distinguished "liberal," this book proposes the thesis that native American anarchism represents an extension to the economic field of early American political liberalism. Thereby, Rocker means to show that anarchism is not "un-American." As *Freedom* has already pointed out, this would presumably go to show that "philosophic" or "individualist" anarchism is American, and revolutionary anarchism not: a kind of propagandistic opportunism.

Outside its extraneous theses, this book contains good things. The sketches of men and ideas are exceptionally good. Except for overestimation of the "libertarianism" of such as Jefferson and Lincoln, the book seems accurate, and it is a fine deed to gather in a single volume the ideas of the 19th century American anarchists, all of them intriguing and very thoughtful persons.

Rocker's concluding chapter, "America in Reverse," requires comment. After presenting the old liberal and anarchist traditions in America, he poses the customary "whither" question. His summation of anti-libertarian tendencies is simply based on misunderstanding of contemporary America. Unless *this* analysis is correct, what precedes is merely a historical curiosity: after all, when does the time come to *apply* Thoreau's excellent dicta about civil disobedience?

Rocker believes that the Alien & Sedition Laws, Know-Nothing Party, Ku Klux Klan, Haymarket Frameup, Criminal Anarchism Laws, represent the anti-libertarian current in American history—the type of "the lingering danger of reactionary tendencies." This is, indeed, a familiar "liberal" view: that irrationalism and mob violence represent the "reaction" and the danger in America.

In fact, however, the violent fascist demagogues are not always the most dangerous enemies of freedom. Any significant radical protest would evoke the savagery of law & lynch. But as the case is, the mass of the people accept the imperialist policies of the American state, and nearly all thought in America is pervaded by an ideology which, if still on many points diverse, more and more revolves on the central pivot of Americanism. Thus, the main present danger comes from a *quarter that specifically disowns and combats the "fascists" and Ku Kluxers*, parades as liberal and progressive, advocates "social" reforms, and appeals to the heritage of Jefferson. This American Mainstream ideology is represented by the old New Deal welfare state, by the second world war, by the atomic bomb, by the present American "diplomacy," by Truman's welfare program. It is this mainstream, not the reactionary backwash, that is hammering together, in the name of democracy, liberalism & progress, a pattern of militarism, war economy and centralism, while purchasing the submission and cooperation of the mass of the people by social reforms, and bidding even for the support of persecuted minorities by championing "tolerance."

All this, Rocker sensed only vaguely, it seems: "Even in the democratic countries political routine and bureaucratic mechanism have weakened the moral response of the citizen and seriously lessened his interest in public affairs. For many democracy has today become just a problem in arithmetic that merely demonstrates that three is less than four, and that consequently four must be right and three wrong." Colossal understatement. The anarchists of whom Rocker writes described contemporary America more sharply and knowingly in their warnings of the trends of their time: a land of manipulable masses and gigantic accumulations of capital and military power.

Since it is so that a person's views tend to be integral, it seems not unfair to surmise that Rocker is able to analyze the pre-history of European fascism because he had a clear view of World War I, which he opposed; and that he is unable to analyze the present because he had an unclear view of World War II, and regarded it as a necessary crusade against fascism.

To the history of anarchism, however, the portraits of the 19th century American anarchists are a contribution.

D. W.

Notes of a Mariner

By Lead Line

The wind is still strong, blowing a six to seven force. Occasionally a seething swell crashes against the ship's weather-side and over the bulwarks, spreading into snow-white foam and gushing itself back through the scuppers and into the sea again. The water is still full of foam and streaks, but the height of the crests and waves is decreasing moderately. Astern there is a wake left by the vessel's propulsion, a color of green and white like melted lava or boiling glass.

The sea will subside, yet she will not change. As she appeared to the eyes of the ancient mariner, so she is the same old sea. For no human frail hand or perverted mind can act a scheme against her. The preacher said "All the rivers run into the sea yet the sea is not full. Unto the place from whence the rivers come thither they return again." Under the galaxy of the cosmos and over the spectral briny deep the larger part of one's small brain begins to celebrate and transvaluate.

World carnage number two. The Encyclopedia Britannica in its item "Ten Eventful Years" states that 15 million losses of military personnel of all nations are accounted for. Losses difficult to appraise such as casualties among civilians, displacements of populations, cannot be accounted for.

After the last bomb was dropped, a German young woman, excusing her scantiness of dress, said the world has other worries than to take note of a

naked woman. Said she: "Wenn du die Welt heute vor die Wahl stellst, einen Fleischbraten und eine nackten Frau — du kannst dich darauf verlassen die Welt nimmt das Fleischbraten." Between the choice of a naked woman and a meat-roast, the world would choose the meat-roast.

In another part of this loused-up earth one enchanted evening a homo sap was propositioning a well-clad lady with a complete feed for the lady's finer naked points . . . But she was holding out for more.

At the city of Kharkov, Tanya Pujachova, who was working in a stolova (people's beanery), was sentenced to a corrective labor camp for 10 years because she stole Soviet people's property consisting of 800 grams of black bread. After one week in the Siberian corrective camp Tanya was delinquent in her work-norm, which means punishment and a decrease of the payok (bread-ration). So she went to sleep with the natchalnik (camp-superintendent), thereby replenishing for herself 200 grams of bread per day . . .

Over a clay ravine black crows are soaring and darting towards a lacerated heap of SS man Hans " ". Kra-Kra-Kra—A crow soars away with a bill-full of worm-flesh. A ripped-open little sack of gold rings is scattered about. These are little tarnished wedding-rings that Hans collected off the Judefrauen (Jew women) before they were expedited to

the gas chambers. The worms are feasting on the cadaver, the crows are feasting on the worms. The gold rings are of no avail to crow or worm. One day a wayfarer on his way home after a sin-forgiving session with the Jewish carpenter from Bethlehem steps into the clay ravine to evacuate his bowels. He finds the gold rings. The wayfarer thanks Jesus for the good fortune he bestowed upon him, then hastens home to tell his wife of his good fortune and give the wife a gold ring and tell her to prepare a lamb-roast . . .

The sky is red, which is a good omen among the men who go down to sea on ships, for the jingle says "Red skies at night is a sailor's delight."

Hear me! mates whose bones are resting in the fathomless deep. Know ye that the Punch-and-Judy show is still going on. Remember shipmates you used to say that things on land are full of evil—they bewitch us, infes' us, steal our money, and feed us Sneaky Pete. Well, my hearties, nothing's changed. The corrupt and parasites are still ruling our destinies as before. The poisonous caldron of hate, greed and lies is thicker than ever. Once upon a time some man of stout heart used to leave this unregenerated jungle of depravity accompanied by the sound of the detonator. But today the apathetic throng is too lazy to think, their faces turn white with fear at the thought of thinking for themselves. They worship zwozd (leader). They are bent and twisted mentally and morally by corrupt faiths and teachings.

There is a ship two point on the port bow. She is very lonely. Her running lights are beckoning to my loneliness. How lonely and how alone we are.

INFANTILE RADICALISM

by Laurance Labadie

"free" to do as he pleases, and "free" to supply his "needs" from the "society" of which he is a part.

In the light of the foregoing, the highly charged feelingful reaction of most socialists and communists at the suggestion that liberty contemplates private property, exchange, competition, money and wages is highly significant.

For what do these signify? Private property grants the individual the right of independence. Exchange implies reciprocity and equity (in contradistinction to maternal and paternal benevolence). Competition is the freedom of choice to cooperate with whomever serves one best. The significance of money is that one pays for what he gets. And the meaning of wages is that one gets paid for what he does.

sion to having calculations of benefit proportional to service? What prompts reversion to the economics of the family, wherein the helpless infant has all his needs satisfied from its parents?

Now communism, or the complete divorce between ability and effort and corresponding benefits—and the benevolent paternalism of authority—is the necessary relation between parents and children. The very life of the helpless child depends solely on benevolence and love. The process of maturing consists in gradually reversing this relation. And the rational economic relation among adults is reciprocity, equity, the exchange of service for service, under the selectivity which promotes individual responsibility, competence, and personal worth.

The child is incompetent and irresponsible. Weaning consists in overcoming these deficiencies. Thus the antipathy of the communist-minded to property, exchange, competition, etc.—that is, to conditions thru which, or under which, calculations tending to uphold the natural relation of benefit proportional to effort—is purely a feelingful response against responsibility. The subject has not completed the weaning process. Repression resulting in complexes and neuroses has stunted and warped the psyche and prevented arriving at adulthood.

The analogy between child life and the aspirations of communists becomes obvious. Society is to become the group mother from which the individuals are to obtain sustenance thru benevolence. The authority of the State is analogous to the father.

It is a startling commentary on the educational influences which the child confronts in the family, the church, and the school, to observe the prevailing alacrity which our society displays in reverting to charity and the supposed benevolence of the paternalistic State for surcease from its aches and pains.

What is one to say, then, of the emotional antipathy to individualism? (The more "scientific" our reformers and revolutionists claim to be, the more apparent becomes their deeply seated feelingful hopes and fears.) How can it be other than arrested emotional maturing—infantilism—a childishness dangerous because it inevitably culminates, whatever be the aspiration, in the authority of the supposedly benevolent Society (or State)? What is the psychological foundation for the universal superstition for the necessity of the State machine? Why the stampede to elect new and better papas to care for us? What are Monarchy, Democracy, Socialism, etc. but evidences of the universal usufructs of an effete "civilization"—the infantilism of the herd gone rampant?

How could these various political and economic mumbo jumbos be taken seriously were it not for the fact that prevailing economic insecurity throughout the world has invoked reversion to the youthful hopes and dreams of the multitudes? The family, the church, and the

school—do they not conspire to make the child obedient and docile? Are they not the instruments by which the immature are conditioned, imposed upon, and subjugated in mind? Are they not really the propagators of that communism which causes mankind to seek solace supinely from those monstrous joy killers—God and the State, and their later counterparts, Society and the Community!

Communism is the childhood of Society; Individualism its coming of age.

Additional Note.

Elaboration and clarification is hardly possible in the brief space of my article. Thus it is wide open for misinterpretation and of course criticism. But even aside from this difficulty, the different factors and problems involved are so numerous and complicated as to keep the pages of *Resistance* filled from now on! I guess the editors don't want to indulge in anything like that. So I wish to append this additional note.

I consider communism, whether authoritarian or free, inherently destructive of individual responsibility. Authoritarian communism, like the Russian variety, deliberately denies the individual such an independent activity as would assure his reaping the natural consequences of his actions (the only root for real responsibility) and makes the individual responsible to the fallible and arbitrary whim of the bureaucrat.


So called free communism so divorces effort and benefit, as far as the individual is concerned, that it would disperse responsibility in a way as to weaken it altogether. The concept of responsibility, in fact, is given a moral and religious flavor, as if it were something an individual should assume. In this it bears a close resemblance to the concept of duty.

Any attempt to evade the law of consequences, as it pertains to individuals (as distinguished from group responsibility) would inevitably lead into authority in order to make an economy workable at all. I think the experience of nearly all attempt to establish communistic colonies proves the truth of this latter statement. Nearly all went to pieces because of internal disagreement. They had no modus operandi for coming to agreement in making decisions. The reason is that such a modus operandi cannot be found, because none exists, short of coercion.

Thus, to my mind, irresponsibility is inherent in communism as in all collectivisms and political systems. The very relationship implied in communism, by spreading responsibility in an indiscriminate manner, would tend to hinder its growth in the individual and would promote a parasitic attitude (infantilism) even if it did not exist priorly. But speaking of infantilism as a consequence of communism, instead of an instigating means of attaining it, is highly speculative and was beyond the scope of my article.

Please keep in mind that the title of my piece is "Infantile Radicalism." It does not include infantile conservatism, infantile reaction, and every other species of infantilism. It is merely a contributory plea for outgrowing infantile thinking wherever it may lie, with especial emphasis on the value of keeping one's own house in order.

Self-styled "free enterprise" people, gathered in propaganda institutes and foundations subsidized by business and financial interest, insofar as they are sincere at all and not mere prostituted hacks, display plenty of childish fear. But that is another story.



An unadvertized National Park of special interest to Anarchists is Mesa Verde in southwestern Colorado. Perhaps the unadvertizing is intentional, as this park gives lie to many government-sanctified fables on the role of family, war, etc., in forming early social groupings.

On this one isolated mesa is exhibited the almost complete story of the rise of social groupings of several races. Graphic dioramas in the museum show the coming together of Folsom Man (20-50,000 years ago) for hunting. They portray the group's social advance by better housing, tools, and agriculture up to the cliff dwellings. A loop trip around the ruins runs in the same way—from early pit houses to cliff dwellings and the Sun Temple—the latter a monument to mutual aid in a stone-age culture. The equinoxes and the winter solstice are marked out here.

The government admits there is no evidence that the dwellings are put in the cliffs for protection from enemy tribes, but rather against the elements, since their mortar was poor. No one-family buildings have been found—only gen or 2-3 family size, grouped in villages. The dwellings around Sun Temple probably aggregated 500 people. At Far View Ruins, on the way out, is a very large double pueblo with large communal fields just below it.

Here is Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid* in panorama, within one day's visiting. A 29-year drought forced this culture to migrate south—war did not end it. The great advances made by a stone-age culture show what can be done in steel-age culture if peace and mutual aid can be applied . . . The paradoxes of this government venture seem to me fittingly climaxed by finding in the public library there a copy of *Mutual Aid* . . . Driving toward Monticello we could see the crude root-cellar homes of many of the people of this "civilization."—BMC.

To Our Readers

In September we sent postcards to our readers to find out if we could expand, and if a cost-subscription price was acceptable if we could not meet expenses through voluntary contributions. The returns were below our hopes and we shall continue as at present.

We do not want to cut the circulation, but the need for curbing expenses has made it necessary to weed out our mailing list. As stated on the card, any reader who did not reply was taken from the list. We hope this does not discourage those readers who want the paper but forgot to mail the card or who feel they cannot afford to pay for it. Will our readers who receive bundles notify us if they want more, or fewer copies?

It seems that our use of the word theoretical on the card was quite misleading. We meant that we would no longer try to be timely and topical (at any rate, we appear too infrequently for that). What we want is articles that are basic, which deal with present-day social institutions, attitudes and problems.

Some readers felt that such a paper would neglect the need for a more popular, educational publication. This is a fact, but it is apparent that a change in approach has already occurred in the paper. Partly this is due to the financial inability to appear regularly, and partly it is a reflection of the thinking and inclinations of the editorial group. We recognize that one publication cannot meet all purposes. Therefore, we feel that we had best pursue that course closer to our inclinations and we hope abilities. We wish in time to build a solid basis for expansion.

It is our understanding that the editors of *Freedom* in England intend to give greater emphasis to news and topical articles about America. There has always been a certain duplication between *Freedom* and *Resistance*, in content and circulation. Such a step by *Freedom* would help meet this need for more popular topical material. Obviously, though, *Freedom* needs a greater circulation than it has at present in the United States if it hopes to take such a step. Readers can obtain sample copies of *Freedom* from us, by simply writing for them. Subscriptions should be sent directly to *Freedom*,

FINANCIAL STATEMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO DECEMBER 22, 1949

ARIZONA: Winslow: F. J. 5.00	\$ 5.00
CALIFORNIA: Chico: A. B. 1.00; Fresno: A. B. 2.00; Grassy Valley: C. G. 2.00; Jackson: N. Z. 2.00; Los Angeles: R. B. G. 3.00, E. B. 1.00; Mill Valley: I. B. 2.00; Pleasanton: A. G. 2.00; Reedley: H. F. 1.00; San Francisco: Potrero Hill 20.00 & 25.00, Piano Recital 13.50, P. E. 2.00; Steiner Group 10.00, A.G. 10.00; Vista: A. S. .24; WALTERIA: J. G. 4.30; Woodlawn: W. F. S. 1.00	102.04
COLORADO: Denver: R. B. 2.00	2.00
ILLINOIS: Chicago: J. F. L. 13.00, Free Society Group, T. B. 3.00, E. J. A. 3.00; Glen Ellyn: J. F. 3.00; Shelbyville: L. W. L. 1.00; Urbana: O. M. 3.00, J. M. 2.00	48.00
MASSACHUSETTS: Boston: T. B. E. 5.00; Revere: R. D. V. 2.00; Somerville: H. P. 2.00	9.00
NEW JERSEY: Glen Gardner: W. H. K. 2.00; Morristown: R. G. 2.00; Newark: C. R. 5.00; Somerville: A. C. 5.00	14.00
NEW MEXICO: Clayton: D. A. T. 1.00	1.00
NEW YORK: Albany: T. S. 5.00; Astoria: S. L. S. 2.00; Corona: R. B. 3.00; Great Neck: W. R. C. 7.00; New York City: B. K. 1.00, G. G. 5.00, L. D. A. 3.00, P. McN. 2.00, W. 3.00, R. A. 1.20, S. V. 1.00, Mr. & Mrs. J. B. 5.00, A. G. 2.00, B. M. 2.00, L. B. H. 1.00, L. L. 1.00, W. R. .75, D. R. 10.00, Social 3.00, Accruals & Misc. 7.91; Troy: B. P. 10.00; Woodstock: J. C. 3.00	78.86
OHIO: Cleveland: F. S. 1.00; Toledo: R. D. M. 1.00	2.00
OREGON: Canby: A. P. S. 1.00	1.00
PENNSYLVANIA: Allentown: W. S. 1.00	1.00
UTAH: Logan: B. McC. 1.00	1.00
WASHINGTON: Seattle: C. L. 2.00, W. v. d. H. 5.00	7.00
ALASKA: Girdwood: D. G. T. 2.50	2.50
CANADA: "Canadian" 9.60; Montreal: B. G. 1.00	10.60
	285.00
Balance, August 1, 1949	12.02
	297.02

EXPENDITURES

Cut (Vol. 8, No. 2)	\$ 4.27
P. O. Box Rent (6 mos.)	8.00
Stationery	8.50
Bank charges	.39
Postage (Vol. 8, No. 3)	36.91
Printing (Vol. 8, No. 3) & Cut	254.28
	312.35
Deficit, December 22, 1949	\$ 15.33

27 Red Lion Street, London, W.C.1. The fee for the bi-weekly is: \$1 for 6 months, \$2 for one year.

Another thing we'd like is a wider writing collaboration in *Resistance*. We wish especially to reach outside the circle of our steady contributors. One comment on one of the cards strikes us as particularly apt: "How about the readers? How do they go about meeting the problems of present-day society? What do they find effective? What are they learning from their experiences?"

... Michael Redcliff has brought to our attention that his statement in his letter in the March issue that Elisee Reclus held religious ideas was erroneous.

... Please note change in secretaryship. New secretary is D. Wieck. For time-saving, though, make all checks and money-orders payable to *Resistance Magazine* and not the secretary.

The Anarchist Bookshelf

• ANARCHIST THEORY

Bakunin, Michael—God and the State	\$.50
Berkman, Alexander—ABC of Anarchism (Now and After, abridged)	.25
Berneri, Camillo—Peter Kropotkin: His Federalist Ideas	.05
DeCleyre, Voltairine—Anarchism and American Traditions	.10
Godwin, William—Selections from "Political Justice"	.25
Goldman, Emma—Place of the Individual in Society	.10
Havel, Hippolyte—What's Anarchism	.10
Hewetson, John—Mutual Aid and Social Evolution	.15
Kropotkin, Peter—The State	.25
Kropotkin, Peter—Revolutionary Government	.10
Kropotkin, Peter—The Wage System	.10
Kropotkin, Peter—Selections from Kropotkin's Writings (edited by Herbert Read)	1.75
Kropotkin, Peter—An Appeal to the Young	.10
Malatesta, Errico—Anarchy	.10
Malatesta, Errico—A Talk Between Two Workers	.10
Malatesta, Errico—Vote—What For?	.10
Read, Herbert—Philosophy of Anarchism	.20
Read, Herbert—Poetry and Anarchism	1.25
Rocker, Rudolf—Nationalism and Culture	3.50
Woodcock, George—Anarchy or Chaos	.35
Woodcock, George—Anarchism and Morality	.10
Woodcock, George—What Is Anarchism	.05

• HISTORICAL

Berneri, Marie L.—Workers in Stalin's Russia	.25
Borghesi, Armando—Mussolini: Red and Black	.50
Icarus—The Wilhelmshaven Revolt	.10
Kenafick, K. J.—Michael Bakunin & Karl Marx	1.50
Laval, Gaston—Social Reconstruction in Spain	.10
Maximov, G.—The Guillotine at Work	1.50
Rocker, Rudolf—The Truth About Spain	.10
Rocker, Rudolf—The Tragedy of Spain	.10
Voline—La Revolution Inconnue (in French)	2.00
Three years of Struggle in Spain	.05
Bulgaria, A New Spain	.25

• ECONOMIC

Hewetson, John—Ill-Health, Poverty and the State	.30
Warbasse, J. P.—Cooperative Decentralization	.10
Woodcock, George—Railways and Society	.10
Woodcock, George—New Life to the Land	.10
Woodcock, George—Homes orhovels—The Housing Problem	.10

• LABOR AND UNIONISM

Brown, Tom—Trade Unionism or Syndicalism	.10
Brown, Tom—The Social General Strike	.05
Equity—Struggle in the Factory	.10
McCartney, W.—The French Cook's Syndicate	.10
Rocker, Rudolf—Anarcho-Syndicalism	.85

• GENERAL

Duff, Charles—A Handbook on Hanging	.30
Faure, Sebastien—Does God Exist?	.10
Goodman, Paul—Art and Social Nature	1.05
Olday, John—The March to Death (cartoons)	.25
Ridley, F. A.—The Roman Catholic Church & Modern Age	.05
Read, Herbert—Education of Free Men	.20
Weil, Simone—The Iliad, or The Poem of Force	.10
Woodcock, George—The Basis of Communal Living	.25

• PERIODICALS

Now—Nos. 6, 7 & 8	each .50
Now—No. 9	.10
Retort (Vol. IV, No. 3)	.40

Copies of the "Resistance" pamphlets "The State," by Randolph Bourne, and "War or Revolution" are free and available on request. Also available are sample copies of "Freedom" from England and "Le Libertaire" from France.